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INTRODUCTION
Corruption is the use or abuse of public office for private gain.'
Although particular definitions of corruption may be different, its
conceptualization appears to be universal, and corruption is
universally condemned.2 Corruption was condemned in the past just
1. This definition is drawn from Joseph Nye, who defines corruption as
"behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains;
or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding
influence." J. S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 61 AM. POL. Sd. REV. 417, 419 (1967); see Thomas F. Burke, The
Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 127, 129
n.9 (1997) (citing Nye's definition); Claire Moore Dickerson, Political
Corruption: Free-Flowing Opportunism, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 393, 396 (1999)
(same); cf Saladin Al-Jurf, Citizens, National Governments, and International
Financial Institutions: Changing Conceptions of Development in the 1990s, 9
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 196 (1999) (stating that the World
Bank's definition of corruption is '[t]he abuse of public office for private gain');
David H. Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 W. POL. Q.
719, 720 (1966) (Corruption is the "misuse of authority as a result of
considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary."); Philip B.
Heymann, Democracy and Corruption, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 323, 325 (1996)
(describing "[c]orruption, as secretly receiving private benefits to affect a decision
that is supposed to be made in the interests of others and uninfluenced by private
gain ... ").
2. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corruption-A General Review With an Emphasis
on the Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 451, 453 (1997) (relating that
"[s]ocieties may differ in their views as to what constitutes corruption, although
the concept finds universal manifestations.").
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as it is condemned now.3 Corruption is condemned by monotheists, 4
pantheists,5 and other religious schools of thought.6
Despite such approbation, corruption continues to exist and
presents a serious obstacle to change in emerging economies.
Corruption imposes tremendous costs in the form of parallel
institutions7  and diminished foreign investment.8  Corruption
degrades bureaucratic decision-making and popular support for
change. 9 Corruption, therefore, is squarely in the sights of those who
wish to effectuate positive changes in emerging economies.10
Most people perceive corruption as a failure of institutional
controls over bureaucrats or a failure of the legal system that controls
3. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI (Robert F. Harper trans., 1904) (making the
taking of bribes illegal like the Egyptian Edict of Harmab). "If a man (in a case)
bear witness for grain or money (as a bribe), he shall himself bear the penalty
imposed in that case." Id. § 4.
4. See The Meaning of the Holy QUR'AN, 2:188 ('Abdullah Yusuf 'Ali trans.,
amana publications 8th ed. 1996) (warning not to "eat up your property among
yourselves for vanities, nor use it as bait for the judges, with intent that ye may eat
up wrongfully and knowingly a little of (other) people's property"); see also id.
28:77 (stating that "Allah loves not those who do mischief").
5. See UPENDRA THAKUR, CORRUPTION IN ANCIENT INDIA 14 (1979)
(explaining that "a perusal of the Sm ti works makes it clear that the earlier Sm ti
writers prescribe a much more drastic punishment for the bribe seeker [than for the
bribe giver], who finds a graphic mention in one of the early inscriptions").
6. See U. Dhammaratana, The Social Philosophy of Buddhism, in THE SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY OF BUDDHISM 1, 17-18 (Samdhong Rinpoche ed., 1972) (noting that
"[s]ila [morality] as practiced by the Buddha may be said to be the widest [moral
principle] in scope.... The second moral precept of refraining from taking what is
not given ... involves abstinence from all deceptive practices such as bribery that
lead to social disintegration.").
7. See discussion infra Part L.A (detailing the costs of the creation of parallel
institutions and noting attempts at various types of parallel institutions through
history).
8. See discussion infra Part I.B (citing empirical evidence that corruption
negatively decreases foreign investment).
9. See discussion infra Part I.D, I.E (arguing that because people lose faith in
corrupt institutions, there is little incentive or possibility for social or economic
growth).
10. See Martin Wolf, Corruption in the Spotlight, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at
23 (stating that it "is difficult to think of a significant international organization not
looking at corruption.").
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the behavior of bribe payers.11 In essence, these views treat
corruption as a conglomeration of discrete failures, which in the
aggregate constitute a phenomenon. While such a description of
corruption undoubtedly does reflect some aspects of corruption, a
differing description may provide fresh insights-and new
approaches to addressing corruption.12
This paper suggests that corruption presents an assurance
problem. 13 An assurance problem exists when all actors are better off
if they adhere to at least the same minimal standard, but are second
best off if, in the event that there are defectors, they join the
defectors rather than continue to' adhere to the standards, and are
worst off if there are defectors but they do not join those defectors.
Actors faced with an assurance problem, therefore, must choose
between cooperating in hopes of accruing the greatest benefit or
defecting as a defensive measure. 4 The standard solution for an
assurance problem is to impose penal sanctions on defectors, but that
solution is not possible in endemically corrupt systems. 5 Thus, this
paper explores a proposal by the Panamanian group, Asociaci6n
Panamefia de Ejecutivos de Empresa ("APEDE"), which offers a
viable solution to assurance problems. 6
In order to demonstrate that corruption is an assurance problem,
this paper discusses the fact that corrupt relationships are neither
11. See Padideh Ala'i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism:
A Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 877, 906-07 (2000) (discussing changes in the manner in which
legal regimes and legal scholars perceive corruption).
12. See Robert S. Lieken, Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1996-97, at 55, 68 (suggesting that controlling corruption
will require a multiplicity of techniques and approaches).
13. See discussion infra Part III (defining the assurance problem as consistent
with game theory wherein survival and success depend on whether actors defect
from a group of participants).
14. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing the prisoners'
dilemma and the problems with assurance).
15. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (noting that sanctions often
do not work in corrupt systems because all institutions, including those that would
sanction, are thoroughly corrupt).
16. See discussion infra Part V.C (describing APEDE and its mission to
promote ethical conduct among businesses in Panama).
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desired nor optimal, 7 but that corruption does confer a short-term
advantage on parties in endemically corrupt systems. 8 In order to
underscore the significance of this issue, however, this paper starts
with a discussion of the effect of corruption on emerging
economies.19 Just as perniciously, corruption degrades societies and
erodes support for change.
I. CORRUPTION AFFECTS EMERGING
ECONOMIES
Corruption affects any polity in a negative manner, but its effects
are particularly acute in emerging economies.2 ° Indeed, positive
change and economic growth cannot occur in endemically corrupt
polities.2 Corruption fosters the creation of expensive parallel
institutions, which siphon resources away from other uses.22
Corruption decreases foreign investment and distorts decision-
making by bureaucrats.23
A. PARALLEL INSTITUTIONS
One of the most burdensome and yet least quantified burdens
corruption imposes on emerging or developing economies is the cost
of maintaining parallel institutions. Parallel institutions are
institutions created alongside "official" or extant institutions to
17. See discussion infra Part II (illustrating that while corruption may confer
some short-term benefits by facilitating the formation of certain political
relationships, a deeper analysis shows that corrupt actors actually degrade these
relationships over time).
18. See id. (arguing that certain actors benefit particularly from corruption,
when other participating actors are not corrupt).
19. See discussion infra Part I.B (observing that corruption discourages foreign
investment, which is vital to the success of emerging economies).
20. See id. (describing the ways that corruption hurts emerging economies, for
example, because governments cannot spend necessary funds on other areas).
21. See discussion infra Part I.E (detailing that corrupt institutions do not
support a climate for growth).
22. See id. (noting that economies cannot grow economically when institutions
are endemically corrupt).
23. See discussion infra Part I.B (noting that foreign investment inevitably
decreases where there are indicators of rampant corruption).
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perform essentially the same functions as the official institutions. 24
The state can create parallel institutions, for example, when an
existing official institution cannot service the needs of all people in
need of that institution. More often, however, parallel institutions
are a reaction to a failure in the state, either because the state uses its
institutions as a means of repressing people, or because the state
actively denies access to its institutions to groups of people.26
24. See M. Michael Rosenberg & Jack Jedwab, Institutional Completeness,
Ethnic Organizational Style and the Role of the State: The Jewish, Italian and
Greek Communities of Montreal, 29 CANADIAN REv. Soc. & ANTHROPOLOGY 265,
67 (1992) (noting that parallel institutions impede participation in official
institutions or provide an alternative to official institutions); see also Richard
Janda, Something Wicked That Way Went: Law and the Habit of Communism, 41
MCGILL L.J. 253, 266 (1995) (describing the creation of parallel institutions in
Central and Eastern Europe that, in many cases, surpassed the official state
institutions). "The parallel culture consisted of myriad artistic, political and
philosophical expressions symbolized by figures such as Lech Walesa and Vaclav
Havel and by events such as the 1956 Hungarian uprising. Parallel institutions
were formed-parallel unions, parallel universities, parallel publishing houses, and
to some extent even a parallel economy." Id. at 266.
25. The Virginia Military Institute ("VMI") provides a convoluted and
ultimately unsuccessful example. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407,
1415 (W.D. Va. 1991) (holding VMI's policy of excluding women to serve an
important state educational objective, and finding that the only means of obtaining
the objective was to exclude women, and therefore holding that VMI's policy was
within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause),
vacated & remanded, 976 F.2d 890, 899-900 (4th Cir. 1992) (ordering the state to
admit women to VMI, set up a parallel institution for women, or discontinue state
sponsorship of VMI in order to comply with the requirements of equal protection),
enforced, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995),
rev'd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that equal protection guarantees preclude the
state from excluding women from VMI's unique educational opportunities, and
finding that the creation of a parallel program for women at a nearby women's
college was insufficient to meet the equal protection standard); see William Henry
Hurd, Gone With the Wind? VMI's Loss and the Future of Single-Sex Public
Education, 4 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 27 (1997) (discussing the case). Parallel
institutions can also be created among states. See Jennifer Schultz, The
GATT/WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment - Toward Environmental
Reform, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 423, 438 (1995) (discussing a proposal among states
"to create a parallel institution to the GATT to handle the environmental aspects of
the trade and environment interface").
26. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of Status-
Consciousness: The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DuKE L.J. 753, 845 (2000)
(discussing the creation of "freedom schools in the United States in the 1960s,"
which were "experimental educational academies designed 'to fill an intellectual
and creative vacuum' in the lives of African-American youth left by inadequate
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Privately created courts provide a striking example of parallel
institutions. In the past, for example, rabbinical courts provided
Jewish communities with viable, albeit extralegal, alternatives to the
corrupt courts of the Ottoman Empire or the brutal courts of the
Nazis.27
Corrupt institutions engender the creation of parallel institutions
because corrupt institutions are dysfunctional.28  They are
dysfunctional for a variety of reasons, including the fact that they
work in ways other than the ways they were designed to function and
in fact often work to the detriment of those they are intended to
serve.29 They are especially dysfunctional because people do not trust
public schooling"); see also Jeffrey S. Morton, The Legality of NATO's
Intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999: Implications for the Progressive Development
of International Law, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 75, 77 (2002) (describing
parallel institutions created by repressed Albanians in Kosovo); Hansjorg
Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (2001)
(discussing the creation of 'parallel institutions by repressed populations in
Yugoslavia and Indonesia). Institutions that are not part of the state but that are
part of the fabric of society might also be copied under similar pressures; the
institutions of legal scholarship provide an example. See Linda S. Greene, From
Tokenism to Emancipatory Politics: The Conferences and Meetings of Law
Professors of Color, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 161, 182-83 (1999) (discussing the
creation of parallel institutions such as conferences and academic proceedings
among legal scholars of color who felt that they were excluded from mainstream
institutions); Harry G. Prince, A Parallel Community-People of Color Legal
Scholarship Conferences and the Advancement of Legal Education, 20 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (discussing the creation of parallel institutions among legal
scholars of color in the United States and noting that the echoes of those parallel
institutions continue to provide "a supportive community for the many teachers
who still find themselves as the only teacher of color at their home institutions").
27. See 4 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW 1592-97 (B. Auerbach trans., 1994)
(describing rabbinical courts created by Jewish communities as an alternative to
the corrupt courts of the Ottoman empire). See generally IRVING ROSENBAUM, THE
HOLOCAUST AND HALAKHAH (1976) (describing the emergence of networks of
religious schools and authorities that interpreted Jewish laws under the Holocaust).
28. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of
Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1915 (1996) (describing corruption as
dysfunctional); Angel Ricardo Oquendo, Corruption and Legitimation Crises in
Latin America, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 475, 488 (1999) ("Moreover, it is precisely
the culture of corruption that, to a significant extent, renders them dysfunctional
and illegitimate.").
29. See discussion infra Part I.C (discussing poor decisionmaking caused by
corruption and obfuscation caused by corruption).
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them and will not use them if it is possible not to do so.30 In the face
of corrupt institutions, therefore, people create parallel institutions.3
Karen Halverson provides a striking example of the creation of
private court-like institutions when state courts are corrupt:
Criminal groups in Russia function to enforce legal rules and resolve
economic disputes. One of the ironies of Russian organized crime is that
criminal groups have long governed themselves according to internal
criminal "laws." Those who rule the criminal world are known as
"thieves-in-law" [vory v zakone], and they resolve disputes between
criminals (or between businesses protected by them) through a procedure
known as a "sorting out" [razborka]. As one Russian described the
razborka procedure, it may involve powerful bankers appointing a "barely
literate," retired ex-convict to resolve a dispute according to the
traditional rules followed in the criminal world. Although often violent, a
razborka may resemble a western-style negotiation session where each
side brings its attorney and the parties follow the Russian Code of Civil
Procedure. The prevalence of the razborka indicates that extralegal
institutions of dispute resolution are perceived by some Russians to be
30. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 44 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997)
(discussing the disengagement of people from state institutions based upon their
mistrust for corrupt institutions); James M. Cooper, Access to Justice, 30 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 429, 431 (2000) (discussing the withdrawal of Latin Americans from the
judicial system because of corruption); Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based and
Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion of Environmental and Land
Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 565, 573 (1992)
(asking "why should some individuals observe the law when others can pay to
elude it? If the rule of law isn't the rule of law, can anarchy be far behind?");
Herbert H. Werlin, The Consequences of Corruption: the Ghanaian Experience, 88
POL. SCI. Q. 71, 79 (1973) (noting that "the effect of corruption is to generate an
atmosphere of mistrust which pervades all levels of administration").
31. See Ariel Porat, Enforcing Contracts in Dysfunctional Legal Systems: The
Close Relationship Between Public and Private Orders: A Reply to McMillan and
Woodruff, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2478 (2000) ("Hence, if legal systems are
dysfunctional due to the corruption of the judges, we may expect all forms of the
private order to emerge: relational contracts, arbitration, business networks, trade
associations, and social networks."); see also Mark Galeotti, Criminal Russia: The
Traditions behind the Headlines, 44 HISTORY TODAY, Aug. 1994, at 12 (explaining
that informal loan arrangements, often at high premiums, are parallel institutions
that reflect state banks); Manash Ranjan Gupta & Sarbajit Chaudhuri, Formal
Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture: A Theoretical
Analysis, 64 ECONOMICA 331, 340-41 (1997) (noting that when farmers have to
bribe officials to get loans, they go to loan sharks).
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superior to the state, thus reinforcing the perceived ineffectiveness of the
judiciary in Russia.32
Institutions are not free.33 Indeed, emerging economies often spend a
disproportionate percentage of their available wealth on maintaining
basic institutions.34 Countries that operate two or more sets of
institutions for the same task spend even more.35 This inefficiency
could seriously impede development and has an obvious negative
affect on the quality of life. 36 Every unit of money expended
32. Karen Halverson, Resolving Economic Disputes in Russia's Market
Economy, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59, 99-100 (1996) (noting that corruption is
endemic in courts in the former countries of the former Soviet Union); see also
Cynthia Alkon, The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under
Post Communist Democratization Programs, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 327, 328
(pointing out that corruption and inefficiency continue to plague post-communist
legal systems).
33. See Marina Ottaway & Theresa Chung, Toward a New Paradigm, 10 J.
DEMOCRACY 99, 99 (1999) (stating that institutions are expensive, and questioning
whether some developing countries can afford the institutions that support
democracy); Montrose M. Wolf, The Development of the Teaching-Family Model,
30 J. APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 381, 381-82 (1997) (comparing the costs of
different models of institutions). Three of the least populated states in the United
States provide examples of the high costs of institutions. See Department Totals-
Operating Budget: Alaska Court System (2003) (reporting that in fiscal year 2002
the Alaskan court system spent $52,740,700), available at
http://www.gov.state.ak.us/omb/04_OMB/budget/ACS/04DeptTotals.ACS.pdf
(last visited Oct. 31, 2004); Iowa Judicial Branch, Budget (2003) (reporting that
the operating budget for the Iowa court system for the 2002-2003 fiscal year was
$113 million), available at http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/courtadminbudrev.asp
(last visited Oct. 31, 2004); Maine Judicial Branch, The State of the Judiciary: A
Report to the Joint Convention of the First Regular Session of the 121st
Legislature (2003) (indicating that the operating budget for the Maine court system
was $54 million), available at
http://www.courts.state.me.us/mainecourts/supreme/speeches/State%20of/2OJudi
ciary%202- I 0.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
34. See WORLD BANK, THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD 13-14 (1997)
(observing that economies with strong institutional capabilities tend to grow
faster).
35. See id. (noting that reformers can start to improve institutional capabilities
by strengthening central agencies and introducing more transparency).
36. See Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in
Latin America, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 185-86 (1995) (noting the negative effect
that money spent to work around corrupt courts has on the ability to develop other
institutions in Latin America); see also Thomas E. Plank, The Essential Elements
of Judicial Independence and the Essence of Pre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. & MARY
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operating a second, unofficial court system, for example, is a unit of
money not expended on health care, on creating business
infrastructure, or on other critical needs.37
Corruption causes people to disengage from the state and to create
parallel sets of institutions. Although it has not been studied by
developmental economists, the cost of these parallel institutions may
have the most deleterious effect on economic and social
development.
B. CORRUPTION DECREASES INVESTMENT INTO EMERGING
ECONOMIES
Corruption decreases foreign investment.38 The most well-known
empirical work demonstrating this effect is that of Paolo Mauro,
which found a "negative association between corruption and
investment, as well as growth, [that] is significant in both a statistical
and an economic sense."39 Edgardo Campos and others find that
while the negative effect is lessened if a corrupt government is
predictable, there is still a negative effect.4"
Orthodox economic theory teaches that lower investment rates
lead to lower rates of economic growth." Development theorists
BILL OF RTs. J. 1, 3 n.3 (1996) (explaining that outside parties' influence on court
decisions can hinder the development of a market economy).
37. See, e.g., Edgardo Buscaglia & Maria Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes
of Corruption in the Judiciary, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 95, 111-12 (1999)
(stating that money spent on alternative community-based institutions in Peru
caused "a loss in the country's productive capabilities due to the high transaction
costs of access to public services").
38. See J. Edgardo Campos et al., The Impact of Corruption on Investment:
Predictability Matters, 27 WORLD DEV. 1059, 1065 (1999) (recognizing that the
emerging consensus among academics and scholars is that corruption impedes
growth and investment).
39. Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681, 705 (1995)
(finding that a measurable decrease in corruption in a country would increase its
investment-to-gross domestic product ratio by almost four percent and the annual
growth of its gross domestic product per capita by almost half a percent).
40. See J. Edgardo Campos et al., supra note 38, at 1065 (commenting that
corruption regimes that are more predictable have a less negative impact on
investment than those that are less predictable).
41. Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World
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argue that foreign investment is critical either to finance
technological innovation or to absorb excess labor capacity. 42
Whatever the theory, empirical observation illustrates that corruption
and the concomitant lower levels of foreign investment are directly
related to low rates of growth.4 3 In turn, low rates of growth are
directly related to deteriorating social conditions and standards of
living.44
Trade Organization, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 305, 348 (1997) (explaining that
a study supported by orthodox economic theory has found that corruption lowers
private investment, thereby reducing economic growth).
42. Most empirical studies suggest a positive relationship between foreign
investment and economic growth. See Ray Barrell & Nigel Pain, Foreign Direct
Investment, Technological Change, and Economic Growth Within Europe, 107
ECON. J. 1770, 1770 (1997) (commenting that foreign direct investments play vital
roles in the acceleration of technological change and economic growth of European
countries); see also Glenn Firebaugh, Growth Effects of Foreign and Domestic
Investment, 98 AM. J. Soc. 105, 105 (1992) (finding that there is a beneficial
relationship between foreign investment and growth). The evidence, however, is
not completely unambiguous, and the point is debated. See Amitava Krishna Dutt,
The Pattern of Direct Foreign Investment and Economic Growth, 25 WORLD DEV.
1925, 1925 (1997) (providing that different patterns of foreign investment affect
growth in host countries differently); Jeffrey Kentor, The Long-Term Effects of
Foreign Investment Dependence on Economic Growth, 1940-1990, 103 AM. J.
Soc. 1024, 1025 (1998) (describing that there is a "contentious" debate between
those who believe that dependence of a national economy on foreign investment
promotes economic growth and those who believe that it causes
underdevelopment).
43. See Mauro, supra note 39, at 700-01 (finding a negative relationship
between corruption and economic growth, as well as institutional efficiency and
economic growth); see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108
Q.J. ECON. 599, 611-15 (1993) (stating that corruption has a distortionary effect
that is greater than heavy taxation because of the added imperative of secrecy);
SHANG-JIN WET, WHY IS CORRUPTION SO MUCH MORE TAXING THAN TAX?
ARBITRARINESS KILLS 1, 2 (NBER, Working Paper No. W6255, Nov. 1997)
(finding empirically that corruption severely distorts economies).
44. See Tord Kjellstrom et al., Current and Future Determinants of Adult Ill-
Health, in THE HEALTH OF ADULTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 209, 211-13
(Richard G.A. Feachem et al. eds., 1992) (discussing that there is a relationship
between economic development and ill health and concluding that improved health
requires a decrease in poverty); Morris D. Morris, Book Review, 39 EcON. DEV. &
SOC. CHANGE 667, 668-69 (1991) ("Although cautions occasionally are noted,
there is general acceptance of the correlation between declining economic growth
rates and deteriorating social conditions.").
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C. CORRUPTION DISTORTS BUREAUCRATIC DECISION-MAKING IN
EMERGING ECONOMIES
Corruption distorts decision-making in two profound ways: by
distorting the parameters within which decisions are made, and by
distorting the pool of decisionmakers.
Corruption, especially bribery, often involves economic
decisions.45 In a rational market system, decisions about which good
or service to purchase are made on the basis of price and quality. 6
On the other hand, rather than purchasing a good or service based on
the price and quality, a corrupt decisionmaker makes a decision on
the basis of the size and quality of a bribe.47 Results of such decision-
making dot the developing world in the form of bridges built where
there are no roads, buildings that easily collapse during earthquakes,
and other poorly-conceived and wasteful products.4a
Corruption also distorts the pool of bureaucrats who make
decisions.49 Capable and honest persons tend to avoid corrupt
bureaucracies.5" In his classic empirical study of corruption in the
45. See Mark B. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 627, 627-29 (1983) (noting that
bribery is often used to influence economic decisions).
46. See id. at 627 (explaining that a fundamental tenet of free market systems is
that economic transactions should be based solely upon the price and quality of a
product and the service provided by the seller).
47. See id. (maintaining that corporate bribery of foreign officials distorts the
relationship between price and quality, thereby affecting the stability of overseas
and domestic business).
48. See Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-bribery Laws as Transnational
Intrusion, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 627, 627-28 (2000) (providing examples of
corruption-driven projects, including disasters involving man-made constructions
in countries such as Turkey and South Korea where builders pay bribes rather than
meeting local business codes). Corrupt bureaucrats also divert resources to hide
illicit activity, which compounds the distortionary effect of their already-poor
decisions. Id.; see also M.S. Alam, A Theory of Limits on Corruption and Some
Applications, 48 KYKLOS: INT'L REV. FOR SOC. SCI. 419, 431 (1995) (noting that
resources are diverted and wasted to hide illicit activities).
49. See Omotunde E.G. Johnson, An Economic Analysis of Corrupt
Government, With Special Application to Less Developed Countries, 28 KYKLOS:
INT'L REv. FOR SOC. SCI. 47, 56 (1975) (explaining that government officials, as
civil servants, are a segment of society who have an incentive and ability to aid in
the collection of corrupt revenue in return for a share of the proceeds).
50. See id. at 57 (observing that capable and honest persons avoid government
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Irrigation Department of a state in southern India, Robert Wade
found that corrupt senior officials sold government posts to junior
officials who desired those positions because such positions allowed
them to extract bribes, thus perpetuating the entry of dishonest and
incapable persons into-and the exclusion of honest decisionmakers
from-bureaucratic service.5 While it is possible to find honest
bureaucrats even in endemically corrupt systems,52 the ill effect of
corruption on the composition of critical decisionmakers in emerging
economies is beyond peradventure.
D. CORRUPTION CORRODES SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
UNDERMINES SUPPORT FOR REFORM
Corruption delegitimizes governments and undermines support for
change, particularly market-oriented change.53  Susan Rose-
Ackerman powerfully summarizes the social affects of corruption
and its detrimental effect on the legitimacy of governments:
"Citizens may come to believe that the government is simply for sale
to the highest bidder. Corruption undermines claims that the
government is substituting democratic values for decisions based on
ability to pay. It can lead to coups by un-democratic leaders."54
work for moral reasons when corruption is pervasive); Vito Tanzi, Corruption,
Governmental Activities, and Markets, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 1995, at 26 (suggesting
that people will seek jobs that pay good bribes rather than jobs for which they are
qualified); Francisco E. Thoumi, Some Implications of the Growth of the
Underground Economy in Columbia, 29 J. INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 35, 44
(1987) (asserting that over time, an honest individual in a corrupt system adapts
and becomes more dishonest).
51. See Robert Wade, The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State Is
Not Better at Development, 13 WORLD DEV. 467, 474-80 (1985) (describing the
sale of offices in a south Indian state).
52. The vast majority of bureaucrats that the author has encountered in his own
fieldwork have been honest.
53. See Karl M. Meessen, Fighting Corruption Across the Border, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1647, 1647 (1995) ("Corruption both in government and
private business has no little role in discrediting freshly installed democratic
procedures and freshly installed free market systems.").
54. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 30, at 44; see also Nancy Zucker Boswell,
Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin America, 3 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 179,
184 (1996) ("Perhaps the greatest casualty of... corruption has been the erosion
of public trust in public institutions and leaders, the foundation of democracy.");
A.W. Cragg, Business, Globalization, and the Logic and Ethics of Corruption, 53
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There are two effects that are particularly acute in emerging
economies. The first is that popular support for reform erodes, and
the absence of that support can seriously undermine the possibility of
positive change.55 The other effect is harder to quantify, but has far
more of a human face: corruption contributes to miserable social
conditions.56 As Martin Davies forcefully put it, "we delude
ourselves if we think bribery to be purely economic conduct
incapable of leading to fear, cruelty, and humiliation. 57
E. CORRUPTION PREVENTS DEVELOPMENT
Corruption clearly impedes or prevents positive change in
emerging economies by distorting, by denying or diverting resources,
and by degrading social support.58 Corruption is detrimental on a
macro scale; it is also not the optimal relationship to enter into on a
micro scale.
INT'L J. 643, 654 (1998) (noting that respect for law and legal institutions is a
"casualty" of bribery); Werlin, supra note 30, at 79 ("the effect of corruption is to
generate an atmosphere of distrust which pervades all levels of administration").
Again, this point is borne out by recent, empirical findings of fact rather than
theoretical speculation. See John Brademas & Fritz Heimann, Tackling
International Corruption: No Longer Taboo, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at
17-18 (describing damage done by bribery scandals to governments in Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, NATO, Pakistan, South
Korea, Venezuela, and Zaire).
55. See Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of
Foreign Direct Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT. L. 1, 27 (1995) ("charges of bribery and corruption can
easily erode popular support for economic reform in general, and foreign
investment in particular"); see also Kevin Done, High Level of Bribes Harms Rate
of Growth, FIN. TIMES, June 28, 1996, at 4 (reporting that, as indicated in a World
Bank development report, the public's perception of widespread corruption in
many transition countries is one of the most significant barriers to market reforms
in such emerging economies).
56. See Martin Davies, Just (Don't) Do It: Ethics and International Trade, 21
MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 601, 614 (1997) (explaining that, however commonplace it
might be in practice, most cultures regard bribery as unethical conduct).
57. Id.
58. See discussion infra Part I (describing the economic and social effect of
corruption on society).
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II. CORRUPT RELATIONSHIPS ARE NOT
DESIRABLE
Corruption does, in some respects, facilitate relationships in the
sense that two or more parties transact with one another.5 9 Indeed, in
the post-colonial period of the 1960s, some scholars did suggest that
corruption enhanced development by creating an avenue by which
foreign investors could enter a developing country. 60 Nathaniel Leff
was at that time the most vocal advocate of the "speed money"
argument,6' although Samuel Huntington has since become better
known.62 Huntington argued that
Corruption may be one way of surmounting traditional laws or
bureaucratic regulations which hamper economic expansion. In the United
States, during the 1870s and 1880s, corruption of state legislatures and
city councils by railroad, utility, and industrial corporations undoubtedly
speeded the growth of the American economy .... A society which is
relatively uncorrupt-a traditional society for instance where traditional
norms are still powerful-may find a certain amount of corruption a
welcome lubricant easing the path to modernization. A developed
traditional society may be improved-or at least modernized-by a little
corruption.
63
59. See Bryan W. Husted, Honor Among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost
Interpretation of Corruption in Third World Countries, 4 Bus. ETHICS Q. 17, 18-19
(1994) (stating that corruption can be conceived of as the transferal of a service
between the bribe donor and the bribe recipient and generally describing corruption
in transactional terms). This statement is not meant to imply that these
relationships are beneficial; any positive statement about corruption is in danger of
being seized upon by scholars desperate for an argument to skewer. See, e.g.
Dickerson, supra note 1, at 397 n. 17 (misquoting the author of this article as
suggesting that corruption is beneficial).
60. See Shihata, supra note 2, at 454 (describing-and disagreeing with-pro-
corruption arguments in the literature, including capital formation, predictability in
government relationships, and "efficient" escape from burdensome regulations).
61. See Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic
Corruption, AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Nov. 1964, at 10, 10-11 (stating that
bribes are speed money that allow productive businesses to bypass recalcitrant
bureaucracies).
62. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES
59-71 (1968) (arguing that bribery can speed up economic development); see also
Bayley, supra note 1, at 719 (arguing, in 1966, that bribery is a step in economic
development).
63. HUNTINGTON, supra note 62, at 68-69.
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Time has proven these scholars wrong, and a more sophisticated
understanding of corruption helps to explain why. The speed money
argument relies on a static analysis of benefits: the cost directly
attributable to a transaction is subtracted from the benefit directly
accruing from a transaction.64 Static analysis is no longer considered
an accurate measure of the effects of corruption.65 Instead, a dynamic
analysis that considers the damage done to a system over a period of
time is considered more accurate, and does not favor the use of
corruption as a development tool. 66
Corruption may actually inhibit the creation of new relationships.
Occasional examples of bravado and hubris aside (as well as
apocryphal stories that usually turn out to be third or fourth-hand),
corrupt actors generally hide their activities and discovery of their
conduct can expose actors to heavy costs. 67 Corrupt relationships are,
therefore, generally created only among those who already have
64. See Husted, supra note 59, at 18-19 (opining that corruption is a transaction
between parties).
65. See Steven R. Salbu, Battling Global Corruption in the New Millennium,
31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 47, 49 (1999) ("The once-popular 'functionalist' view
of bribery, under which corruption purportedly yields benefits of allocative
efficiency and optimal capital formation, retains little favor among today's
academics.").
66. See THE WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE
ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 14-15 (1997) (stating that by using a dynamic analysis,
what appears to be a short-term gain can be shown to impose tremendous costs in
the long run); Buscaglia supra note 37, at 112 (noting that "present corruption
decreases future productivity, thereby reducing dynamic efficiency"); Shihata,
supra note 2, at 454-55 (positing that the consensus among scholars is that the
long-term damage done by corruption far outweighs any immediate benefits).
Salim Rashid's research illustrates how static and dynamic analyses of corruption
might lead to different conclusions. See Salim Rashid, Public Utilities in
Egalitarian LDC's: The Role of Bribery in Achieving Pareto Efficiency, 34
KYKLos: INT'L REV. FOR SOC. Sci. 448, 448-55 (1981). Rashid studied bribes paid
to obtain telephone service in India: his original premise was that the payment of
differently sized bribes would help to differentiate customers in a system that
otherwise was completely egalitarian, and thus bribes would allow for Pareto
optimalization. Id. Rashid found that while this may have been the case at first,
over time, bureaucrats came to expect bribes and also created inefficiencies in
order to extract more and larger bribes; rather than contributing to Pareto
optimality, bribery degraded the system. Id.
67. See FRITZ F. HEIMANN, SHOULD FOREIGN BRIBERY BE A CRIME 7 (1994).
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some reason to trust one another.68 Corruption also creates barriers to
relationships by allowing corrupt actors to buy monopolies from the
state.69
Relationships formed through corruption are generally more
burdensome to actors than legitimate relationships.70 Far from cutting
through red tape, corrupt relationships actually consume more time
and are more costly to maintain. Corrupt relationships bear a risk of
discovery and punishment, as well as the monetary cost of
maintaining secrecy.71 Corrupt relationships are not enforceable in
public institutions, and therefore must be enforced through more
costly means. Corrupt relationships also corrode the internal culture
of a bribe-paying company.72
The myth that "corruption is how business is done" or that
"corruption is acceptable" in some systems73 does not stand up to
close scrutiny.74 Certainly, corruption has become endemic in some
68. See Alam, supra note 48, at 449 (stating that bribe-taking officials limit
entry to those whom they trust).
69. See Frederick M. Abbott, Foundation-Building for Western Hemispheric
Integration, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 900, 914 (1996-97) ("Governmental
corruption and non-transparency are likely to benefit inefficient local operators
over efficient multinational operators."); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Commercial Bribery
and the Sherman Act: The Case for Per Se Illegality, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 365,
390-91 (1987) (noting that inefficiencies are created when firms bribe to create
monopolies); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV.
1, 16 (1989) (providing examples of how bribes are used to obtain or retain
monopolies). The author of this article notes that he has spoken with many
businesspeople who purchased a monopoly through a bribe, only to find that the
same monopoly was sold to other bribe payers, or whose monopoly was later
revoked in favor of a later payer of a better-quality bribe.
70. See Alam, supra note 48, at 449 (describing how bribery may create costs
when bureaucrats hold back information and resources in order to extract larger
bribes).
71. See Schlieffer & Vishny, supra note 43, at 600 (noting that there are costs
imposed by the "imperative of secrecy").
72. See Cragg, supra note 54, at 653 (noting that the payment of bribes creates
an environment in which employees think that it is appropriate to put their own
interests ahead of those of the company).
73. See H. Lowell Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Government's
Campaign Against International Bribery, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
407, 473 n.248 (1999) (asserting that corruption is a way of life in some cultures).
74. See David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled
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systems,75 but even in those systems, endemic corruption seems to be
an aberration when examined longitudinally.76 Moreover, not one
study indicates that corruption is accepted in any society.77
Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
593, 611-16 (2000) (discussing and dismissing the anecdotal but persistent belief
that corruption is ethically-justified); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 702-
03 (1984) (dismissing the myth of corruption's justifiability as an example of
cultural arrogance with the argument that "[i]t is often the Westerner with
ethnocentric prejudice who supposes that a modem Asian or African society does
not regard the act of bribery as shameful in the way that Westerners regard it.").
75. See Mois~s Naim, The Corruption Eruption, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 245
(1995) (stating that the incidence of corruption worldwide has exploded); see also
Konyin Ajayi, On the Trail of a Spectre-Destabilisation of Developing and
Transitional Economies: A Case Study of Corruption in Nigeria, 15 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 545, 545 (1997) (noting that the recent "astronomical" increase in the level of
corruption in most parts of the world is alarming); Maria Dakolias & Kim
Thachuk, Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical Process in Judicial
Reform, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 353, 357 (2000) (reiterating Mois~s Naim's
observations regarding an "eruption" in the incidence of corruption); David A.
Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a New
International Legal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 457, 463 (1998) (noting
that globally, corruption remains "disturbingly common"); James P. Wesberry, Jr.,
International Financial Institutions Face the Corruption Eruption: If the IFIs Put
Their Muscle and Money Where Their Mouth Is, the Corruption Eruption May Be
Capped, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 498, 499-500 & n.1 (1998) (noting that, over
the last fifty years, corruption has become "pervasive").
76. As one corruption expert notes,
The incidence of grand corruption has increased tremendously during the last
decade. What used to concern a relatively small number of people working in
a relatively small number of countries has now become a major South-wide
problem.... [By] general consensus, there has been a tremendous
deterioration in the last ten years, with grand corruption becoming the general
rule, rather than the exception, in major government-influenced contracts in
the South.
GEORGE MOODY-STUART, THE GOOD BUSINESS GUIDE TO BRIBERY: GRAND
CORRUPTION IN THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 2-3 (1994); see also Ajayi, supra
note 75, at 545 (emphasizing the recent large-scale increase in levels of
corruption).
77. Fritz Heimann notes,
[t]hat bribes have to be paid secretly everywhere, and that officials receiving
bribes have to resign in disgrace if the bribe is disclosed, makes clear that
bribery violates the moral standards of the South and the East, just as it does
in the West .... There is no country in the world where bribery is either
legally or morally acceptable.
Heimann, supra note 67, at 7; see also RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, COMPETING WITH
CORRUPTION AS ANASSURANCE PROBLEM
A growing amount of empirical evidence suggests that even
endemically corrupt societies abhor corruption."8 In an early study on
Sierra Leone, Sahr John Kpundeh found that while corruption in
Sierra Leone was endemic, those who lived there nevertheless
considered corruption harmful and supported anticorruption
regimes.7 9 Robert Mattes and Cherrel Africa found a similar rejection
of corruption in South Africa." The author of this paper, along with
George Siedel and Matt Kasden, has conducted fieldwork in
Mongolia and Bulgaria, and found that students reject corruption.8 '
The author's fieldwork in Kazakhstan found that citizens of that
country reject corruption. 82
INTEGRITY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 104 (1993) ("In no country in the world
do high government officials openly practice and publicly justify the acceptance of
large sums of money for preferential treatment.").
78. See Daniel Y. Jun, Bribery Among the Korean Elite: Putting an End to a
Cultural Ritual and Restoring Honor, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1071, 1085
(1996) (drawing an important distinction between a practice that occurs in a culture
and a practice that is accepted in a culture by noting that although bribery has
become very prevalent in Korean, it is still not accepted morally).
79. See SAHR JOHN KPU7NDEH, POLITICS AND CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: A CASE
STUDY OF SIERRA LEONE 161-66, 172 (1995) (showing that in interviews of three
hundred persons representing all areas of the country and all social strata, 83.8% of
interviewees stated that a new government should put a high priority on combating
corruption). Interestingly, public distaste extended to such acts as public officials
using their influence to have relatives admitted to college. Id. at 173.
80. See Robert Mattes & Cherrel Africa, Corruption-The Attitudinal
Component: Tracking Public Perceptions of Official Corruption in South Africa,
1995-1998, at 1-4 (Oct. 12, 1999) (setting forth data showing that 46% of South
Africans feel that most, if not all, public officials are involved in corruption, and
that public concern about corruption is on an upward curve), available at
http://www.transparency.org/iacc/9thjiacc/papers/day2/wsl/d2wslcafricarmattes.
html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
81. See Philip M. Nichols, George J. Siedel, & Matthew Kasdin, Corruption as
a Pan-Cultural Phenomenon: An Empirical Study In Countries at Opposite Ends
of the Former Soviet Empire, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 215, 231 (2004) (noting that
among survey respondents, almost half of Bulgarians and over one-third of
Mongolians ranked corruption as the most serious social problem on the survey
list).
82. See Philip M. Nichols, The Fit Between Changes to the International
Corruption Regime and Indigenous Perceptions of Corruption in Kazakhstan, 22
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 863, 927 (2001) (stating that 96% of survey respondents
indicated that fighting corruption should be a high government priority). The
author has also conducted fieldwork studies in Belize, Senegal, and France, none
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In short, corruption not only corrodes a society in general, it also
imposes burdens on those who are involved in corrupt relationships.
A corrupt relationship is sometimes better than no relationship at all,
but it is not the type of relationship that a rational actor would
voluntarily choose. 83
III. CORRUPTION PRESENTS AN ASSURANCE
PROBLEM
Corruption imposes generalized costs, and a corrupt relationship is
rarely optimal. Nonetheless, corruption can confer a short-term
benefit on an actor, and maintaining high standards when others are
corrupt could prove fatal to an actor.84 Corruption, therefore, presents
actors with a dilemma often referred to as an assurance problem.85
of which have been published, but all of which indicated that societies in those
countries reject corruption.
83. See THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL
CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 226 (1999) (concluding-pursuant to
extensive discussions of bribery with Indian businesspersons in India-that while
most admitted to having paid bribes, all expressed outrage and disgust at the
practice).
84. See supra Part II.
85. Amartya Sen developed the concept of the assurance problem in the 1960s.
See Amartya K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount, 81 Q.J.
ECON. 112, 114 (1967) (building upon the problem of the prisoners' dilemma to
establish the concept of the assurance problem); see also Lee Anne Fennell,
Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local Public
Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 40 n.135 (2001) (crediting Amartya Sen with
formulating the assurance problem). The assurance problem has been used to
explain the behavior of the United States and Europe in negotiating and signing the
anti-bribery conventions, using game theory to examine the behavior of nations
rather than individual actors. See Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Values
and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 141, 164 (2002) (describing the assurance problem faced by
countries that want to curtail transnational bribery, but could be placed at a
competitive disadvantage if they comply and other countries defect). One such
attempt at curtailing transnational bribery is the Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in Intemational Business Transactions. Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998)
(entered into force Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter "OECD Convention"]. This
Convention requires OECD Convention members to criminalize transnational
bribery. Id.; see also Hess & Dunfee, supra note 74, at 602 ("The most significant
advancement in the fight against corruption and the strongest demonstration of its
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Corruption confers a short-term benefit over legitimate actors
because corruption distorts the decision-making process. s6 According
to traditional neo-classical economic theory, a decisionmaker makes
a decision based on the price and fit of a good or service.8" A rational
producer, therefore, uses resources to lower the price of a product
and to enhance its quality.88 In a corrupt system, on the other hand,
the price or quality of the product is irrelevant.89 The decisionmaker
bases the decision instead on the size and quality of the bribe.90 A
rational, albeit corrupt, producer, therefore, uses its resources to
increase the size of the bribe and improve the quality of the bribe
rather than quality of the product.9 Assuming that resources are
finite and that producers initially have roughly equal access to those
resources, a producer who uses even a portion of its resources
legitimately will not be able to create a bribe of the same size or
universal condemnation is the [OECD Convention]"); Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce,
Corruption and Competitiveness in Global Business-The Dawn of a New Era, 24
MELBOURNE U. L.R. 349, 368 (2000) ("Perhaps the most significant step in the
efforts to combat corruption in global business was taken on 17 December 1997 in
Paris, when members of the OECD signed the [OECD Convention]."); Jong Bum
Kim, Korean Implementation of the OECD Bribery Convention: Implications for
Global Efforts to Fight Corruption, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 245, 254 (2000)
("the OECD Bribery Convention has built the most significant multilateral
instrument in the fight against bribery and corruption").
86. See discussion infra Part I (analyzing the long-term damage of corruption
to a state's economy and infrastructure).
87. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing
the importance of the price and quality of goods or services in a rational economy).
88. See id. (presenting alternative reforms that may help economic growth).
89. See infra note 71 and accompanying text (describing how hiding illicit
activities leads to a waste of resources).
90. See Heimann, supra note 67, at 7 (explaining that a high-quality bribe is a
bribe that a corrupt bureaucrat can use without fear of discovery or punishment,
and that "bribes everywhere have to be paid in secret").
91. See M. Shahid Alam, Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political
Economy of Underdevelopment, 48 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 441, 448-52 (1989)
(indicating that manufacturers and providers have little incentive to produce high-
quality, low cost goods and services, and instead are rewarded when they divert
money from production to the payment of bribes; see also Stanley Sporkin, The
Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269, 280 (1998) (noting that
corruption often results in low-quality construction).
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quality as a producer who dedicates all of its resources to creating a
good bribe.
Corruption degrades systems and societies and, in the long-run,
imposes heavy costs on all actors.92 All actors are better off if a
system operates without corruption. Few people accept corruption,
and it is conceivable that most actors would prefer not to engage in
corrupt acts. Nonetheless, corruption can confer a short-term benefit,
and if one actor engages in corruption, then in the short run that actor
has a significant advantage over those who do not.93 Corruption,
therefore, presents a paradigmatic assurance problem.
The assurance problem is most often described with the
descriptors of game theory. 94 As such, it can be contrasted with the
far better-known prisoners' dilemma game. In a prisoners' dilemma
situation, an actor is best off if he or she defects while everyone else
complies and is next best off if everyone complies. 95 In an assurance
92. See discussion infra Part II (explaining that it is more difficult and
inefficient to maintain a corrupt relationship than a legitimate relationship).
93. See infra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the example of the
stag hunt, where the defector experiences a short-term gain and compliant
individuals experience a total loss).
94. See Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications
for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 923, 924-25
(1985) (explaining that basic solutions for game models such as the prisoners'
dilemma may display divergent ramifications for the institutionalization, stability,
and adaptability of regimes and for the role of hegemony in the international
system). See generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION
AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); ARTHUR A. STEIN,
WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (1990); Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy:
Hypotheses and Strategies, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (Kenneth A. Oye
ed., 1986).
95. See Steven Kuhn, Prisoner's Dilemma, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2003), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112003/entries/prisoner-dilemma (last visited
Oct. 31, 2004). In a prisoners' dilemma game, players are each offered a set of
choices about whether to defect from the group or not; if one player defects and no
others do, then that player is best off and the other players are worst off, however,
if no player defects, then the players are next best off, and if all of the players
defect then they suffer more than if none of the players had defected. Id. The
prisoners' dilemma game is a tool that "illustrates a conflict between individual
and group rationality. A group whose members pursue rational self-interest may all
end up worse off than a group whose members act contrary to rational self-
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problem, on the other hand, all actors will be best off if all actors
coordinate their behavior, but in the event that there are defectors,
those who defect are better off than those who do not defect.
96
The assurance problem is often illustrated through games similar
to the prisoners' dilemma game. One of the more common is the stag
hunt game, based on a scenario created by Jean Jacques Rousseau. 97
A group of hunters can successfully hunt and kill a stag, which they
will share, if they coordinate their efforts.98 Alternatively, they could
defect and hunt a rabbit, which is a smaller animal but which an
individual hunter could probably kill by himself.99 The hunters who
continue to hunt a stag after others have defected will not be
successful and will have nothing. 00 The dilemma faced by an
individual hunter is that if she does her job for the group she will get
a large portion of meat-if every other hunter does his or her job as
well; but if she does her job for the group and someone else defects,
she will not only get nothing but will also have passed up an
opportunity to get a medium portion by not defecting herself.' An
interest." Id. at 1.
96. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Public Reason as a Public Good, 4 J.L. Soc'Y
217, 259-60 (2003) (explaining that the difference between the prisoners' dilemma
and the assurance game is that in the assurance game, the payoff the individual
receives when other individuals cooperate is greater than that in the prisoners'
dilemma); see also Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The "Conservation Game": The
Possibility of Voluntary Cooperation in Preserving Buildings of Cultural
Importance, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 733, 736 (1997) (noting that in those
circumstances in which prospects of voluntary cooperation are high are better
modeled by a cooperative assurance game, and where prospects of cooperation are
low, a game even more competitive than a prisoners' dilemma game is an
appropriate model).
97. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in THE
ESSENTIAL ROUSSEAU (Lowell Bair trans., Meridian Books 2d ed. 1983) (setting
forth the parable of the stag hunt, in which several hunters agree to cooperate to
catch a stag; when one hunter defects from the group in order to catch a small




101. See GameTheory.net, Assurance Game, Game Theory Dictionary (noting
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economic actor in a potentially corrupt system faces a similar
dilemma. If she behaves appropriately and everyone else does, as
well, she will join the others in reaping a large reward; but if others
defect and she does not join them, their small gain will surpass hers
and she may starve.
Mathematicians can calculate elegant solutions to hypothetical
games.10 2 These solutions obviously have little application in the real
world, because both the vastly greater number of actors in real life13
and the vastly greater complexity of real life cannot be replicated in a
game."0 Nonetheless, the insights gained through game theory are of
use to persons constructing real social structures, and although a
mathematically calculated solution may have little application, the
general concept of a solution may be valuable. Unfortunately, the
most obvious solution probably will not work.
IV. PUNITIVE LEGAL SANCTIONS DO NOT SOLVE
A CORRUPTION ASSURANCE PROBLEM
Punitive sanctions for defection have long been perceived as the
solution to an assurance problem. °5 Robert Axelrod showed that
102. See John C. Harsanyi, Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior, in
RATIONAL CHOICE 82, 94-96 (Jon Elster ed., 1986).
103. See Susan Block-Lieb, Congress' Temptation to Defect: A Political and
Economic Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems,
39 ARiz. L. REv. 801, 817-18 (1997) (illustrating that the difficulty and cost of
monitoring and punishing a game increases with the number of actors involved);
see also Carlisle Ford Runge, Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance
Problem in Collective Action, 46 J. POL. 154, 169-70 (1984) (explaining that the
larger the group of actors, the lower both the probability of contribution by others
and the assurance with which such estimates are held become).
104. See Bruhl, supra note 96, at 259 (noting that in real life, situations are in
fact more complex and uncertain than in hypothetical collective action problems);
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23, 23 (1989)
(discussing the limitations of assumptions and noting that a richer model for
positive analysis may look to psychology and sociology to obtain a more accurate
picture of social influences on human behavior).
105. See William A. Edmundson, Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and
Law's Claim to Authority, 15 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 51, 55 (2002) (stating that legal
sanctions transform compliance into a moral mandate). See generally Margot
Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation, 29
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retaliation, which he labeled "tit-for-tat," would lead to coordinated
behavior and the accrual of the maximal benefit for all.1"6 While
sanctions can be imposed through a variety of sources, the most
common is criminal law. Indeed, John Rawls famously found "no
need even for the penal law except insofar as the assurance problem
[makes] it necessary."' 10 7
In the case of an endemically corrupt system, however, criminal
sanctions often do not constitute a viable means of ensuring
compliance with minimal standards of behavior.108 The reasons for
this are fairly obvious: non-enforcement of enforcement standards
can be purchased through a corrupt relationship. 109 As Hiram
OTTAWA L. REV. 233, 238 (1997-98) (noting that sanctions may be applied to
noncompliant actors in solving assurance problems).
106. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 36-39 (2d ed.
1989) (discussing the preservation of coordination through the threat of sanction
for defection); Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists, 75
AM. POL. ScI. REV. 306, 308 (1981) (analogizing sanctions in coordination games
to regulatory actions designed to prevent collusion).
107. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 315 (2d ed. 1971). Rawls questioned
the general need for criminal law in a just society because just society's motives
would be duly regulated by a sense of justice. Id.; see also David Crump, Game
Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meanings of Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
331, 408 (2001) (discussing Rawls' arguments in the context of game theory and
the assurance problem).
108. See WORLD BANK, supra note 34, at 13 (noting that official enforcement
bodies in corrupt states are themselves susceptible to corruption); 0. Lee Reed,
Law, the Rule of Law, and Property: A Foundation for the Private Market and
Business Study, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 441, 467-68 (2001) ("Other problems have been
caused by widespread corruption and an inadequate enforcement process to
implement laws, underscoring the need for a developed legal system to interpret
and enforce rules and to settle disputes over owned resources."); Stephen J. Toope,
Legal and Judicial Reform through Development Assistance: Some Lessons, 48
MCGILL L.J. 357, 375 (2003) (stating that enforcement of corruption laws is
impossible if enforcers are corrupt); Celeste Boeri, Note, How to Solve Argentina's
Debt Crisis: Will the IMF's Plan Work?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 245, 250-51 (2003)
("Dependence on [a] legally enforced strategy is likely to be ineffective.").
109. See Tarik Abdel-Monem, Foreign Nationals in the United States Witness
Security Program: A Remedy for Every Wrong?, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1235, 1244
(2003) ("In a number of nations, formal institutions are undermined by corruption,
violence, or other factors that counteract efforts of law enforcement authorities.");
Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1185 (2003) (criticizing politicians who attempt to
abolish, weaken, or cripple regulations dealing with corruption); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1379 n. 266 (2003) (noting that
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Chodosh summarizes: "Vague ethical norms, a poorly regulated and
fragmented body of legal professionals, weak monitoring capacity,
corrupted review systems, and ineffectual prosecution and
enforcement substantially sustain systemic impunity for illicit
practices." 10 Daryl Levinson goes further, cautioning that weak
enforcement agencies confronted with powerful corrupt actors not
only will refuse to enforce rules, but also will become even more
corrupt themselves.1"
corruption impedes the enforcement of rules by state entities); Daniel Richman,
Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
749, 825 (2003) (describing the difficulty of pursuing cases of corruption against
enforcement agencies). Examples of such degradation can be found throughout the
world. See, e.g., Jane Goodall, The Evolving Legal Status of Chimpanzees, 9
ANIMAL L. 1, 90 (2003) (describing the non-enforcement of conservation laws due
to corrupt officials' integral involvement in both illicit activity and the
enforcement of rules against the illicit activity); Jeremiah E. Goulka, A New
Strategy for Human Rights Protection: Learning from Narcotics Trafficking in
Mexico, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 239 (2001) ("Political corruption is
the core of the problem. It pervades the entire system, keeping the dysfunctional
system oiled, maintaining and protecting the 'standards' of police and judicial
perversion. The government has become, in many areas, so corrupt as to make the
Rule of Law a comic impossibility."); Nathanael Heasley et al., Impunity in
Guatemala: The State's Failure to Provide Justice in the Massacre Cases, 16 AM.
U. INT'L L. REv. 1115, 1154 (2001) (finding that massacre cases against
government officials are not prosecuted in Guatemala because of corruption);
Steven E. Hendrix, Innovation in Criminal Procedure in Latin America:
Guatemala's Conversion to the Adversarial System, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 365,
369 (1998) (stating that although there are basic laws against corruption, there is a
lack of enforcement and compliance); Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth From
Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 49 AM.
J. COMP. L. 249, 303-05 (2001) (finding empirically that corruption impedes
enforcement of arbitral awards in China); Boeri, supra note 108, at 251 (discussing
how rampant political corruption in Argentina hampers implementation of
reforms). Indeed, in the United States prosecution of local corruption cases was
given to federal agencies in part as a response to the impossibility of using corrupt
institutions to impose legal sanctions on corrupt actors. Id. See also George D.
Brown, New Federalism's Unanswered Question: Who Should Prosecute State and
Local Officials for Political Corruption?, 60 WASH & LEE L. REv. 417 (2003);
Charles Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the
Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171 (1977).
110. Hiram E. Chodosh, Emergence from the Dilemmas of Justice Reform, 38
TEX. INT'L L.J. 587, 601 (2003); see also The Experts Roundtable: A Hemispheric
Approach to Combating Corruption, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 759, 786 (2000)
("despite a plethora of laws, corruption persists because of inadequate enforcement
and impunity").
111. See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REv. 345, 390-91
1332 [19:1307
CORRUPTIONAS ANASSURANCE PROBLEM
When state institutions fail, the actors must turn to other means of
ensuring compliance. APEDE represents an organization capable of
doing so.'' 2
V. A CERTIFICATION SOLUTION TO THE
ASSURANCE PROBLEM
Panama in general and APEDE in particular illustrate that
corruption is sometimes best understood as an assurance problem,
and also provide a solution to the problem that is independent of
criminal law."' Corruption almost certainly exists in Panama, and
APEDE's members, who are prominent businesspeople, are among
those best poised to reap the short-terms gains of corrupt
relationships. Nonetheless, APEDE's members recognize that
corruption imposes tremendous costs both on themselves and on
their country, and are actively seeking means to establish and enforce
standard behavior among all members." 4
A. PANAMA
Approximately three million people live in Panama-an area
roughly the size of South Carolina or the Czech Republic located at
the juncture of Central America and South America."' Panama's
service sector is the primary driver of its economy, accounting for
(2003) (noting that a corrupt group may even conspire to overthrow or undermine
the sanctioning body); see also Bruce L. Benson, Corruption in Law Enforcement:
One Consequence of 'The Tragedy of the Commons" Arising with Public
Allocation Processes, 8 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 73 (1988) (discussing the
corruption of entities charged with enforcing corruption standards).
112. See discussion infra Part 5.3 (introducing APEDE's activities).
113. See id. (addressing APEDE's non-governmental status and methods for
combating corruption).
114. See id. (describing APEDE's mission to develop free enterprise in
Panama).
115. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2004 (2004)
[hereinafter CIA WORLD FACTBOOK] (noting that Panama's total area measures
78,200 square kilometers), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pm.html (last visited Oct. 31
2004).
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around three-fourths of Panama's gross domestic product."6
Panama's government, installed after the United States invaded
Panama to overthrow its military dictatorship, consists of a
constitutional democracy with a President, a unicameral Asamblea
Legislativa, and a Corte Suprema de Justicia.II7
Panama is a vibrant and economically active polity that possesses
control over arguably the most important waterway in the world-
the Panama Canal.'18 Panamanians should enjoy tremendous success,
yet a great deal of evidence indicates that corruption is a serious
problem in Panama.
B. CORRUPTION IN PANAMA
There are five reasons, ranging from Panama's colonial past to
current perceptions, to believe that corruption is an issue in Panama.
The first reason stems from its colonial history. Although people
inhabited Panama"19 before Rodrigo Bastidas "discovered" Panama
in 1501, or Crist6bal Col6n built a settlement in 1503,120 the present
situation in Panama's may be a product of its colonial roots. Panama
116. See id. (estimating that Panama's GDP in 2003 was 18.62 billion dollars,
which ranked 109th in the world, or $6300 per capita, which was 108th in the
world).
117. See id. (detailing that members are elected for five-year terms to 78
legislative seats available for five year terms, and nine justices appointed to ten
year terms); see also Mark Andrew Sherman, Comment, An Inquiry Regarding the
International and Domestic Legal Problems Presented in United States v. Noriega,
20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 393, 400 (noting that Noriega problematized the
1984 election that installed officials following the U.S. invasion of Panama).
118. See CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 119 (including the canal in the
service sector, which accounts for three fourths of Panama's GDP).
119. See SAILA DUMMAD IGUANABIGINIA, LA MIGRACION DE LOS KUNAS HACIA
LA COSTA ATLANTICA: SEGUN LA HISTORIA ORAL KUNA (Atilio Martinez ed.,
1999) (discussing the Kuna people of pre-Columbian Panama).
120. See CHARLES LOFTUS GRANT ANDERSON, OLD PANAMA AND CASTILLA
DEL ORO: A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF THE DISCOVERY, CONQUEST, AND
SETTLEMENT BY THE SPAINARDS OF PANAMA, DARIEN, VERAGUA, SANTO
DOMINGO, SANTA MARTA, CARTAGENA, NICARAGUA, AND PERU 85-116 (1911)
(compiling a collection of first hand accounts of the first Spanish interactions with
what is now Panama, including the fourth journey of Crist6bal Col6n-whose
anglicized name is Christopher Columbus-in which he founded the first Spanish
settlements on the territory).
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was a Spanish colony from 1538 until Simon Bolivar liberated it in
1821.121 Once freed from Spanish rule, Panama continued to be
associated with what is now Colombia until it achieved its
independence from Colombia in 1903.122 That Panama was a colony
for so long supports an inference of corruption. 123
Secondly, Panamanian independence coincided with the United
States' interest in the possibility-and later with the realization-of a
canal across the isthmus; indeed, some argue that the United States'
interest greatly helped Panama achieve independence.1 24 For most of
121. See CHRISTOPHER WARD, IMPERIAL PANAMA: COMMERCE AND CONFLICT
IN ISTHMIAN AMERICA, 1550-1800 46-7 (1993) (describing Spanish imperialism as
being particularly heavy-handed); see also infra note 123 and accompanying text
(tracing corruption's origin in many countries, including Panama, to colonial rule
and noting that post-colonial states are marred by corruption and authoritarian
rule).
122. See generally THE UNITED STATES DISCOVERS PANAMA: THE WRITINGS OF
SOLDIERS, SCHOLARS, SCIENTISTS, AND SCOUNDRELS, 1850-1905 (Michael LaRosa
& Germdn R. Mejia eds., 2004) (compiling a collection of first-hand reports of this
portion of Panama's history).
123. See Francis N. Botchway, Good Governance: The Old, the New, the
Principles, and the Elements, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 159, 169 n.44 (2001) (attributing
corruption in Latin American to its Spanish colonial heritage); Thomas J. Moyer,
Mediation as a Catalyst for Judicial Reform in Latin America, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 619, 642 (2003) (emphasizing that corruption in Latin America
became an everyday occurrence during colonial times under Spanish rule); see also
Grady Jessup, Symbiotic Relations: Clinical Methodology-Fostering New
Paradigms in African Legal Education, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 377, 381 (2002)
("indigenous legal systems were largely ignored or corrupted by European
colonizers"); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism: An Environmental
Justice Critique of Free Trade, 78 DENY. U. L. REv. 9 79, 980 n.5 (2001) (noting
that colonially trained administrators are generally perceived to be corrupt); John
McFarlane, Corruption and the Financial Sector: The Strategic Impact, 19 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 47, 50 (2000) (listing colonialism as a cause of corruption in Asia); cf El-
Obaid Ahmed El-Obaid & Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Human Rights in Africa-A
New Perspective on Linking the Past to the Present, 41 MCGILL L.J. 819, 822
(1996) (describing how post-colonialism has been marked by corruption and
authoritarianism).
124. See OVIDIO DIAZ ESPINo, How WALL STREET CREATED A NATION: J.P.
MORGAN, TEDDY ROOSEVELT, AND THE PANAMA CANAL 157-63 (2001)
(discussing the involvement of Roosevelt and J.P. Morgan in Panama's liberation
from Columbia). Espino's argument, of course, discounts the contributions of so
many Panamanians whose serious commitment to the independence of their
country was probably the most significant contributor to Panama's independence.
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the early years of its independence, Panama and the United States
were inextricably intertwined in a hegemonic relationship in which
the United States controlled and at the same time protected those in
power in Panama. 125 Again, the control exerted over Panama by the
United States is a reason to infer corruption.
126
A third reason to infer corruption is that an authoritarian regime
appeared in Panama once the United States relinquished its control.
For many years, military generals actually ruled Panama, even on
those occasions when an elected president sat in office. 127 The last of
Panama's military dictators was Manuel Noriega, who for many
years worked closely with and even for the United States, but who in
the end was finally removed from office with the assistance of a U.S.
125. See MICHAEL L. CONNIFF, PANAMA AND THE UNITED STATES: THE FORCED
ALLIANCE 19-20 (2001) (exemplifying the enormity of U.S. influence over Panama
in its discussion of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty that gave canal rights to the U.S.
"in perpetuity"); see also JOHN LINDSAY-POLAND, EMPERORS IN THE JUNGLE: THE
HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE U.S. IN PANAMA 7 (2003) (stating that the United States
"was the guarantor of Panama's separation from Columbia," and therefore held
enormous power in Panama).
126. See Henry J. Richardson, III, U.S. Hegemony, Race, and Oil in Deciding
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq, 17 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 27, 40 (2003) ("Predictably, the hegemon will move to corrupt the
community's system of law by using its power to lift its actions beyond adverse
adjudication, to bar enforcement of the law against its inevitable wrongs, and to
demand and construct or impose pseudo-legal rationales and strategies that shield
its objectives by attempting to credibly justify its drive for community control.");
see also Chantal Thomas, International Debt Forgiveness and Global Poverty
Reduction, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1711, 1714 (2000) (noting that during the Cold
War, the United States was willing to support corrupt regimes in exchange for
those regimes' support).
127. See CARLOS GUEVARA MANN, PANAMANIAN MILITARISM: A HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION 195 (1996) (lamenting that although civilian attorneys control
Panama's security force, aspects of militarism are still present); ROBERT C.
HARDING II, MILITARY FOUNDATIONS OF PANAMANIAN POLITICS 32-35 (2001)
(recounting how the military's emergence in Panamian politics created illegitimacy
in civilian politics). See generally Steve C. Ropp, Explaining the Long-Term
Maintenance of a Military Regime: Panama Before the U.S. Invasion, 44 WORLD
POL. 210 (1992) (advancing both new and existing theories to account for
Panama's corrupt military history).
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invasion of Panama. 28 There is little doubt that Noriega's regime
was very corrupt:
From the early 1970s to 1989, Noriega secured progressively greater
dominion over state military and civilian institutions in Panama, first as
his nation's chief of military intelligence and later as commander of the
Panamanian Defense Forces. In the early 1980s, Noriega's position of
authority brought him into contact with a group of drug traffickers from
the Medellin area of Colombia (the 'Medellin Cartel'). Various Medellin
Cartel operatives met with Noriega's associates and, later, with Noriega
personally, regarding the Medellin Cartel's desire to ship cocaine through
Panama to the United States. Eventually, Noriega and the Medellin Cartel
reached the first of a series of illicit agreements. Thereafter, from 1982
through 1985, with Noriega's assistance, the Medellin Cartel transported
significant quantities of cocaine through Panama to the United States. It
also utilized its relationship with Noriega to move ether for cocaine
processing and substantial cash proceeds from drug sales from the United
States to or through Panama. 
129
It is also fairly clear that Noriega's regime actively pushed
corruption from the top down. As Michael Fowler and Julie Bunck
argue, "[u]nder the regime of General Manuel Noriega, official
corruption in Panama assumed a somewhat different guise, directed
by the country's leadership."' 3 ° Authoritarian regimes tend to
produce corrupt societies and systems, and Noriega's regime in
128. See generally JOHN DINGES, OUR MAN IN PANAMA (1990) (detailing the
United States and Noriega's intimate, three-decade-long relationship that
ultimately ended in failure in 1989 when the United States invaded Panama).
129. United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 1997); see
Michael A. McKenzie, Recent Development, Treaty Enforcement in U.S. Courts-
United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1992), 34 HARV. INT'L L.J.
596 (1993) (discussing many cases and questions generated by the United States'
capture and criminal prosecution of Manuel Noriega); Recent Case, Separation of
Powers-Head-of-State Immunity--Eleventh Circuit Holds That the Executive
Branch's Capture of Noriega Exempts Him from Head-of-State Immunity-United
States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997), 111 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1998)
(reviewing the Eleventh Circuit's holding in United States v. Noriega and arguing
that the Noriega court should have adopted a default no-immunity rule, rather than
a default immunity rule, which gave the judiciary excessive foreign policy power).
130. Michael Ross Fowler & Julie Marie Bunck, Narcotics Trafficking, Central
American Prisons, and the Law, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 433, 469
(2002).
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particular lent itself to oppression and corruption. 31 Panama still
experiences echoes of the corruption engendered during its periods
of authoritarian rule.
132
The fourth issue that allows for in inference of corruption in
Panama is that the country has been a center for money laundering
and a hub for drug transshipments. As recently as a decade ago,
Silvano Paternostro described Panama as a country in "chaos"
because of narcotics trafficking and money laundering. 33 Many
organizations have lauded the Panamanian government and its
citizens for extraordinary diligence in eliminating these practices, but
all observers recognize that they once existed in Panama.'34
131. See Eytan Gilboa, The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the use of
Force in the Post Cold War Era, 110 POL. SCI. Q. 539, 540 (1995) (listing various
corrupt activities in which Noriega involved himself, such as drug trafficking, arms
sales, and money laundering, not to mention his systematic violation of treaties
with the U.S. and harassment of U.S. forces).
132. See Delissa A. Ridgway & Mariya A. Talib, Globalization and
Development - Free Trade, Foreign Aid, Investment and the Rule of Law, 33 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 325, 343 (2003) (stating that although there is no longer a dictator in
Panama, its politics are still riddled with corruption, and noting that democracy is
rarely the result of the United States' efforts to forcibly remove dictators from
power).
133. See Silvana Patemostro, Panama: Casablanca Without Heroes, 10 WORLD
POL'Y J. 53, 53-58 (1993) (writing that despite the United States' initial urgency to
investigate drug trafficking and money laundering, four years after the 1989
invasion, drugs continued to be run through Panama daily).
134. See BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY
REPORT (2002) (identifying Panama as a center for money laundering and drug
transshipment but emphasizing that Panama has undertaken several measures to
curb these behaviors), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/inI/rls/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/8487.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004);
see also Jaime Ospina-Velasco, Strengths and Hurdles in the Struggle Against
Asset Laundering and the Repression of Financial Crime: The Columbian
Perspective, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 96, 104 (2000) (noting that the Latin Federation of
Banks, a federation of national banking associations, adopted the Declaration of
Principles and Actions of the Latin American System Against Asset Laundering in
Panama City to support Inter-American efforts to curb money laundering).
Compare FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING,
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REVIEW TO
IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE
WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES 8 (2000)
(identifying Panama as a center for money laundering, but noting that the
government is committed to combating that practice), available at
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Panama's drug trafficking and money laundering problems are
notable because many people closely associate these activities with
corruption. 
35
Fifth, those who work with or observe Panama perceive a great
deal of corruption. Transparency International's Corruption
Perceptions Index is the most authoritative measure of perceived
corruption in a country. 36 The Corruption Perceptions Index
correlates different sources of information as to how much perceived
corruption exists in a country, assigns a score to a country, and then
ranks the scored countries against one another. 37 With a score of ten
indicating no perceived corruption and a score of zero indicating
http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/ncct2000-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2004), with
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-
COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE
EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES 9-10 (2001) (delisting
Panama and describing Panamanian efforts to implement an anti-money laundering
program), available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/NCCT2001 en.pdf (last
visited Oct. 31, 2004).
135. See Janet Reno, Remarks, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1009, 1009 (1996)
(proclaiming that all countries have long suffered from drug trafficking and the
money laundering and corruption that results from this practice, and urging the
judiciary to take steps to address this problem); Nora M. Rubin, A Convergence of
1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to Curb Corruption and Bribery in International
Business Transactions: The Legal Implications of the OECD Recommendations
and Convention for the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, 14 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 257, 269-70 (1998) (arguing that technology allows those in the drug trade
to use their profits as "potent corruption tools").
136. See Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law,
10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 404-05 (2000) (describing Transparency
International, which is comprised of a group of former World Bank executives, as
one of the most promising developments in the anti-corruption field); Wesberry,
supra note 61, at 500 n.7 (1998) (stating that Transparency International is the
"best known global NGO" because of its Corruption Perception Index).
137. See John Graf Lambsdorff, Corruption in Comparative Perception, in
ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 81, 87-97 (Arvind K. Jain ed., 1998) (explaining the
corruption perception index at length); see also Posadas, supra note 136, at 405-07
(describing the activities of Transparency International).
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nothing but corruption, Panama's score of 3.7 in 2004138 indicates
that observers perceive a great deal of corruption in Panama.
C. APEDE
APEDE is a group comprised of Panamanian business leaders.139
Although the state recognizes APEDE, the organization remains
aggressively independent of the state and is a completely private
sector civil enterprise. 40  APEDE's core mission includes
"monitoring and strengthening the development of free enterprise,
one of the pillars of any free society."' 141 To accomplish this mission,
APEDE undertakes activities such as educating businesses, creating
linkages among businesspersons, and lobbying for appropriate
laws. 142 APEDE also states that its fundamental tasks include
combating corruption and promoting ethical conduct among
Panamanian businesses. 143
138. See Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2004 (Oct.
20, 2004) (explaining that the Corruption Perception Index is a good tool for
measuring perceived corruption, but noting that a greater number of sources results
in greater reliability as to a country's ranking; Transparency International requires
a country to have at least three surveys, and Panama had seven), available at
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/cpi2004.en.html#cpi2004 (last visited Oct.
31, 2004).
139. See Asociacion Panamena de Ejecutivos de Empresa, ZQu6 es APEDE?
(reporting that Panama's business community widely accepts APEDE and values
its efforts to promote economic development in Panama), available at
http://www.apede.org/apede/index.html#0 1 (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
140. See ENRIQUE ARTURO DE OBARRIO, PANAMA: HACIA UNA SOCIEDAD CADA
VEZ MAS INTEGRA-LA VISI6N Y MISION DE LA APEDE 1 (2003) (describing the
stated mandate of APEDE).
141. gQu es APEDE?, supra note 139 (elaborating that APEDE achieves its
mission through initiatives such as the Conferencia Annual de Ejecutivos de
Empresa, which focuses on issues ranging from poverty reduction to the
administration of justice and economic develop, or the Law on Transparency,
which scrutinizes the public administration and advocates for accountability).
142. See id. (stating that its activities also include promoting equal opportunity,
education, urban development, and business training).
143. See id. (explaining that "APEDE's Ethics and Civic Affairs Commission is
leading the business sector in the fight against corruption."); see also DE OBARRIO,
supra note 140, at 1 (stating that the primary goal of APEDE is to promote
transparency in government and ethical conduct in private companies).
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APEDE's involvement is interesting for at least two reasons. The
first is that business is a vastly underappreciated resource in
combating corruption. Throughout the world, from the Clean Hands
movement in Poland to the Development Coalition in South Africa,
businesses are acting to curb corruption.144 Indeed, private
individuals and businesses initially funded Transparency
International, the driver of much global activity with respect to
corruption. 45 Businesses constitute a potent adversary to systemic
corruption because they are funded, organized, and habituated to
achieving discrete goals.
The second reason why APEDE's involvement is interesting is
that it underscores the fact that corruption can be described as an
assurance problem. APEDE clearly recognizes that corrupt
relationships are not optimal, and also clearly recognizes that
defection from minimal standards of behavior could be perceived as
a necessary defense mechanism by which actors hope to hedge
against other defectors. Indeed, APEDE explicitly recognizes private
sector parties acting in an ethical fashion as the most probable means
of effectuating changes in the government sector. 146
APEDE has initiated educational programs on corruption, and is
working with the government to create laws on transparency and
accountability. 47 Among the most intriguing of APEDE's ideas,
however, is the proposal that the organization certify companies
based upon how they make decisions regarding potentially corrupt
situations.
144. See Carolyn Hotchkiss, The Sleeping Dog Stirs: New Signs of Life in
Efforts to End Corruption in International Business, 17 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG
108, 111 (noting that developing countries are attempting to combat corruption and
that business leaders globally have witnessed the negative effect of corruption on
profit margins and are publicly calling for it to end).
145. See TI History, Transparency International, 2004 (detailing the
involvement of businessmen in the creation of Transparency International and
early funding from private foundations such as the Ford Foundation), available at
http://www.transparency.org/about-ti/history.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
146. DE OBARRIO, supra note 140, at 4.
147. See infra note 139 and accompanying text (incorporating education into
APEDE's plan to combat corruption).
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VI. A CERTIFICATION PROCESS FOR DECISIONS ABOUT
CORRUPTION
A. THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ORGANIZATION
The idea of certifying decision-making processes is not novel.
Two of the best-known sets of privately created standards deal with
decision-making processes rather than with the actual makeup of
goods or services. The International Standards Organization's ISO
9000 group of standards concerns quality management processes, 4 '
while its ISO 14000 group concerns environmental management
processes.1 49 The International Standards Organization is instructive
in contemplating a certification process for decisions about
corruption because they create "generic management system
standards."'' 0 By "generic," the organization means "the same
standards can be applied to any organization, large or small,
whatever its product-including whether its 'product' is actually a
service-in any sector of activity."'' 1 By "management system," the
organization means "what the organization does to manage its
processes, or activities in order that the products or services that it
produces meet the objectives it has set itself."'52 By "management
system standards," the organization means "a model to follow in
setting up and operating the management system. Experts in the field
148. See Lisa C. Thompson & William J. Thompson, The ISO 9000 Quality
Standards: Will They Constitute a Technical Barrier to Free Trade under the
NAFTA and the WTO?, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 155 (1997) (discussing ISO
9000's quality management processes and their impact on trade).
149. See Paula C. Murray, Inching toward Environmental Regulatory Reform-
ISO 14000: Much Ado about Nothing or a Reinvention Tool?, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 35,
38 (1999) (touting ISO 14000 as "as perfect tool to foster evolutionary
environmental policy reform"); Paula C. Murray, The International Environmental
Management Standard, IS014000: A Non-Tariff Barrier or a Step to an Emerging
Global Environmental Policy, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 577 (1997) (noting an
increasing awareness of the need for environmental protection on a global scale
and, at the same time, a recognition that international trade liberalization policies
may be at odds with environmental protection).
150. Intemational Standards Organization, Generic Management Systems
Standards, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso9000-
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have reached a consensus that this model is built on "state of the art
practices."'53
Businesses that wish to receive certification go through an
auditing process.'54 In the audit, an auditor examines each stage of
decision-making and of effectuating decisions against a template of
internationally-accepted best practices. If needed, the auditor
suggests processes designed to improve decision-making to meet
those best practices. When the processes under scrutiny conform
with international standards, then the auditor issues a written
assurance to that effect. The business may, if it chooses, ask the
auditor to register that assurance in a central registry. 55
The advantage to a business of this certification is fourfold. First,
decision-making processes may be improved. 5 6 More effective
management processes are obviously to any business's advantage.57
The second, third and fourth advantages are less obvious, but far
greater in scope.
The second advantage is that certification adds reputational value.
This is particularly true with respect to the environmental
management system group of standards. Much of the public in many
of the world's regions are quite sensitive to the environmental
behavior of a supplier.'58 ISO 14000 certification signals to that
153. Id.
154. See Murray, supra note 149, at 69 (discussing ISO 14000's role in
certifying firms through audits of business practices); see also Paulette L. Stenzel,
Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management Standards Provide a Viable
Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 237, 240-41 (2000)
(providing a background of the ISO and ISO standards for implementation).
155. See Donald A. Carr & William L. Thomas, Devising a Compliance
Strategy Under the ISO 14000 International Environmental Management
Standards, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 85, 88 (1997) (explaining the integral role of
compliance auditing ISO 14000 audit and registration process).
156. See Stenzel, supra note 154, at 273-74 (discussing costs savings companies
have attributed to improved decision-making following an ISO audit).
157. See Linz Audain, Judicial Careers, Judicial Selection, and an Agency Cost
Model of the Judicial Function, 42 AM. U.L. REv. 115, 134 n.103 (1992) (noting
that effective business managers create conditions that enable firms to profit for
long durations).
158. See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658, 672-
79 (1996) (discussing the deeply-held environmental values of many consumers).
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public that a given firm makes environmental decisions in an
appropriate manner.'59
Third, certification makes a business's product or service cheaper
by reducing the transaction costs involved in investigating that
business. 160 Potential buyers, particularly those contemplating long-
term or multiple-repeat arrangements, must investigate many aspects
of a potential supplier, including the supplier's quality assurance
processes.161 Such investigations can be particularly expensive when
businesses are physically distant from one another or when one of
the businesses is in a remote location. 62 Given the choice between
suppliers that appear equal in every other way, a rational buyer will
choose the supplier that will be cheaper to investigate. ISO 9000
certification significantly reduces the cost of investigation because
someone else has completed a substantial part of the investigation of
the business that has received certification has already been done.
Finally, conforming to internationally-accepted standards lowers
the risk that a business will be found legally liable for its behaviors
(although, of course, conformity does not entirely eliminate that
risk).163 This is particularly pertinent to environmental management
standards, because environmental laws change a great deal and
generally become more expansive.
159. See Samuel N. Lind, Eco-Labels and International Trade Law: Avoiding
Trade Violations While Regulating the Environment, 8 INT"L LEGAL PERSP.
113, 149-50 (1996) (discussing the value of ISO 14000 certification as a signal of
environmentally responsible behavior).
160. See Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services:
In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 221,
268 (1995) (observing how positive signaling to regulators reduces the immense
costs of compliance).
161. See id. at 269 (discussing the tremendous transaction costs that the need for
due diligence imposes).
162. See Richard L. Bohanon & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Mongolian Bankruptcy
Law: A Comparative Analysis with the American Bankruptcy System, 7 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (1995) (making exactly this point using Mongolia as an
example).
163. See Stenzel, supra note 149, at 274-75 (discussing legal implications).
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B. STANDARDS FOR DECISIONS THAT MAY INVOLVE CORRUPTION
Business ethicists have long realized the need to provide a
decision-making framework for individuals in a business who are
confronted with morally complex situations."6 In the absence of such
a framework, decisionmakers can become confused, can make
contradictory decisions, or decisions that they will later regret. 165 A
situation that may involve corruption presents the same dangers,
would benefit from prior thought and guidance.
The certification process APEDE envisions would provide this
guidance and would also accrue all the advantages obtained through
the certification process. The certification process would also
mitigate the assurance problem presented by corruption. 1
66
APEDE proposes a code that gives life to a fairly simple standard:
when confronted with a complex moral situation, act in the way that
would be considered most appropriate if all of the facts were made
universally public. 167 This simple standard is especially applicable to
situations where corruption may be an issue, as corruption is
generally hidden and carried out in secret. 68 In order to be certified,
164. See Keneth Goodpaster, Some Avenues for Ethical Analysis in General
Management, HARV. Bus. SCH. CASES No. 9-383-007, 1 (1982) (discussing the
need for frameworks to guide decisionmakers in morally ambiguous situations).
165. A story often used by business ethicists to demonstrate these tendencies is
Bowen McCoy's The Parable of the Sadhu. HARV. Bus. REV., May-June, at 54
(1997). The author of this story was a senior executive at the banking firm of
Morgan Stanley who spent a six month leave trekking in the Himalyas. Id. During
one particularly strenuous trek, in which the party had to reach and cross an ice-
covered pass at 18,000 feet, McCoy's party found an "almost naked, barefoot body
of an Indian holy man-a Sadhu" who was experiencing hypothermia. Id. at 55.
The party was not prepared to make decisions that required balancing the life of a
stranger against the completion of their goal. Id. at 57. After a great deal of internal
agitation, the party made the Sadhu comfortable and then left him; the decision
distracted the entire party. Id. at 55-56. Moreover, Bowen does not know whether
the Sadhu lived or died, and the decision still troubles him. Id. at 56. Bowen, and
others, argue that the party would have been better off if it had prepared a process
for making decisions about morally complex situations. Id. at 57-58; see also
James R. Elkins, Lawyer Ethics: A Pedagogical Mosaic, 14 ND J. L. ETHICS &
PUB POL'Y 117, 142-45 (2000) (discussing the parable of the Sadhu at length).
166. See Lind, supra note 159 and accompanying text (highlighting the value of
the certification process).
167. See DE OBARRIO, supra note 140, at 5.
168. See Heimann, supra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that because
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an independent auditor would have to find a process for training each
person who makes decisions for a business in both the content and
use of the code.
A code, though laudatory, is not by itself sufficient. Certification
should also examine decision-making processes and impose at least
three structural requirements. First, decisions that are at risk of
involving corruption must be approved by multiple and distinct
parties. Second, managers must make all decisions in a transparent
fashion so that observers can assign responsibility to an accountable
party. Finally, an enterprise must account for all of it's funds in a
manner that precludes the creation of slush funds that could be used
to finance bribes. 169
Upon binding itself to an appropriate code, meaningful training in
that code, a decision-making process that spreads out authority but
focuses accountability and responsibility, and a financial accounting
process that prevents the creation of secret funds, a business could be
certified and that certification registered. 70 Companies could agree
that they would only conduct business with other certified
companies, and the government could require that companies who
wish to conduct business with the government be certified. Foreign
parties might also require certification of their Panamanian business
partners. 7 ' In these ways, certification would become a critical
attribute for conducting business.
Each of the four benefits that arise from the International
Standards Organization certification process would accrue to
businesses adhering to this certification model. 72 First, clearer
direction and training in dealing with complex situations improves
management, and improved management inures to the benefit of a
corrupt actors generally hide their activities, the discovery of their conduct leads to
increased costs).
169. Cf David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International
Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 177 (1995)
(stating that the impetus behind many U.S. anticorruption laws is the elimination of
slush funds that could be used to hide corrupt payments).
170. See discussion infra Part VI.A (elaborating on the certification process).
171. See discussion infra Part V.B (discussing corruption in Panama).
172. See discussion infra Part VI (describing ISO's group of standards).
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business. Corruption presents a complex situation that the code
would help actors navigate.
173
Second, certification also would confer reputational benefits. A
majority of people condemn corruption. 174 Most people also perceive
corrupt relationships to be harmful.175 Certification is a signal that a
particular business does not engage in this form of conduct.
Third, certification also makes a good or service cheaper,
particularly for foreign buyers. In addition to the general distaste that
most businesses have for corrupt relationships, an increasing number
of jurisdictions criminalize transnational bribery, and thus an
increasing number of businesses are required to investigate possible
corrupt relationships among those with whom they might conduct
business. 176 A meaningful certification process would signal to these
foreign entities that they could safely conduct business with a
certified business without the transaction costs that would otherwise
be associated with entering into a business partnership.
Finally, certification would also mitigate the risk of future legal
liability. Actors in emerging economies face two challenges that
increase the risk of future liability. The first is that, by definition, the
laws and regulations in emerging economies undergo a great deal of
change. 177 The second is that as societies emerge from endemically
corrupt regimes, it is quite possible that they will impose liability
retroactively on the businesses with which those regimes entered into
corrupt relationships. 178
173. See Salbu, supra note 65, at 49 (discussing the moral and legal complexity
of corruption).
174. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (highlighting the major religions'
rejection of corruption).
175. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (providing a historical context of
the condemnation of corruption).
176. See OECD Convention, supra note 85 (requiring OECD members to
criminalize transnational bribery); see also Eric Stein, International Integration
and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 489, 495 (2001)
(stating that the OECD "represents 85 percent of world trade and 90 percent of
world foreign investment").
177. See Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 229, 231-32 (1999) (noting that the most salient aspect of emerging
economies is change).
178. The difficulties experienced by businesses in Indonesia who had been
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Most importantly, a certification process addresses the assurance
problem that corruption presents. Corrupt relationships are not
optimal, and most actors would prefer to avoid them, but might not
be able to do so without assurances that other actors are behaving in
accordance. 179 A certification process provides such an assurance. 180
First, a very clear standard is established for conduct by all actors.
Second, the conduct of actors is monitored. Third, defection is
penalized, not by dysfunctional state institutions, but instead by a
diffuse marketplace.
CONCLUSION
Corruption is a serious impediment to positive change in emerging
economies. As such, it merits the attention given to it by both
policymakers and scholars. Too often, however, that scrutiny
analyzes corruption as simply a failure of enforcement, and does not
take into account the choices facing an actor in an endemically
corrupt setting.''
A more textured understanding of corruption reveals that
corruption often presents an assurance problem.'82 Actors do not
want to enter into corrupt relationships and they understand that both
associated with Suharto during that corrupt regime's reign serve as a warning of
possible retribution in other countries. See Dave Lindorff, Stark Lessons from
Indonesia, GLOBAL FIN., Aug. 1998, at 5 ("hundreds of major international
contracts" are under review). Retroactive liability is not an unknown concept; in
the United States the Comprehensive Environmental Reclamation and Cleanup
Liability Act imposes retroactive liability for acts that may have been legal at the
time they occurred but which contributed to environmental degradation. See Bruce
Howard, A New Appreciation for Retroactive Liability In CERCLA: An
Appreciation of the Synergy Between Common and Statutory Law, 42 ST. Louis
L.J. 847, 847 (1998) (observing that retroactive liability is not an unknown
concept, and that the doctrine of retroactive liability is seriously flawed).
179. See supra Part VI.A (explaining how certification encourages anti-
corruption compliance).
180. See supra notes 158-165 and accompanying text (outlining the numerous
benefits of certification).
181. See discussion infra Part II (noting that the complexity of corruption
requires many differing solutions).




they and their society are better off if they do not.'83 In the absence,
however, of assurances that their competitors are not acting
corruptly, actors who behave honestly risk losing everything. 184
Unfortunately, the usual solution to an assurance problem-penal
law--does not work in endemically corrupt systems.'85
The certification process suggested by APEDE solves the
assurance problem. 8 6 Businesses are assured that other actors are
complying, and know that those who do not will be punished by the
marketplace. Certification also confers other benefits that make it
attractive.
Certification alone will not eradicate corruption. It does, however,
constitute an important component in the bundle of structures that
will, and it highlights a better understanding of an ancient but still
too little-understood phenomenon.
183. See Jun, supra note 78, at 1085 (noting that although corruption may be a
prevalent practice in Korea, it is not a morally acceptable practice).
184. See Rousseau, supra note 97 and accompanying text (stating that,
consistent with the underlying rationale of the stag hunt, actors who coordinate
their actions will be best off, but when there are defectors, those who do not defect
risk losing everything).
185. See WORLD BANK, supra note 34, at 13 (highlighting the problems
associated with corruption within official enforcement bodies in endemically
corrupt systems).
186. See discussion infra Part V (describing the process that APEDE uses in
attempting to solve assurance problems).
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